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Resumen  
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Este estudio explora los determinantes tanto de la decisión de comprar condones como de la 
demanda en sí misma para dos muestras de trabajadoras sexuales y hombres que tienen sexo con 
hombres en India. Mediante las bases de datos recogidas por el Proyecto de Prevención en 
Fronteras se obtuvo información para varias ciudades donde se aplicaron programas de 
intervención y otras utilizadas como control. Dado que la distribución gratuita de condones no es 
aleatoria se utilizó un proceso de selección de Heckman para cada grupo poblacional.  Esta 
estrategia sirve para evaluar intervenciones públicas a través de la distribución gratuita de 
condones y la promoción de la prueba del VIH. En trabajadoras sexuales se encontró que el 
número de clientes determina la demanda, pero no se encuentra efectos desde el número de 
condones recibidos gratuitamente. En hombres que tienen sexo con hombres, en cambio, el 
número de condones recibidos gratuitamente determina una mayor compra. 
 
Palabras claves: Sesgo de selección, modelo de selección de Heckman, política, VIH / SIDA. 
 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the determinants of both the decision to purchase condoms and the actual 
demand for two samples of female sexual workers (FSW) and men who have sex with men (MSM) 
in India.  Through the datasets collected by the Frontiers Prevention Project we obtained 
information for several cities where intervention programs were administered and for others that 
were taken as controls. As the free distribution of condoms is not random, we use a Heckman 
selection process for each sample. This strategy serves to evaluate public interventions based on 
free supply of condoms and promotion of HIV testing. On sexual workers it is found that the 
number of paying clients determines demand, but no significant effect is found from the number of 
condoms received for free. On men who have sex with men, in turn, the number of condoms 
received for free determines greater purchase. 
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1.      Introduction 
 
When surveying the economics of HIV/AIDS, the central issue is the individual and social 
incentives in avoiding HIV infection, after at least one member of the population has become 
infected with the virus (Gaffeo, 2000). What matters then is the relation between individual 
choices (in a situation of asymmetric information since one of the sexual partners may not know 
the HIV status of the other), the degree of optimality of social outcomes (since externalities arise 
because of the infection risk generated by population groups such as FSW and MSM) (Stoebenau 
et al., 2009), and the large differences in bargaining power (since many FSW/MSM may not be in 
the position to negotiate condom use because of economic dependence on clients) (de la Torre et 
al., 2010). When combined, these issues imply the emergence of several transmission-enhancing 
market failures, which constitute the grounds on which the public financing of health-care projects 
may be justified (Over, 1999).  In order to effectively reduce HIV risk in any population it is then 
important to understand its sources and determinants as a starting point to implement interventions 
(Blankenship et al., 2008). 
Conceptually it is not possible to think of a (close to) perfect substitute good for male 
condoms when the issue at stake is the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly 
HIV/AIDS.  Though the female condom could be an alternative option, the current conditions in 
developing countries is that it has not been fully introduced and is not expected to occur in the 
upcoming years, thus it is not relevant for the analysis below and do not bring any potential bias 
for omission of variables. Therefore, henceforth when we mention condoms we refer to male 
condoms for simplicity. 
When considering condoms as the most effective prevention method to control the spread of 
HIV in sexually active individuals (Bracher et al., 2004; Tremblay et al., 2005), in order to 
identify the determinants and incentives for individuals to purchase one or more units, one central 
assumption is that condom purchase and its use are highly and positively correlated. That is, 
though it is a commodity that may be stocked, its rotation rate is high enough to justify its 
frequent purchase.  Moreover, the analysis below implicitly accepts that having multiple sexual 
partners carries an associated greater HIV-infection risk, both involving clients, and casual or 
long-term partnerships (Macaluso et al., 2000; Outwater et al., 2000; Eaton et al., 2010). For 
FSW/MSM then it is sensible to analyze the consistency of condom use over time, both with 
casual or new partners and with primary partners, since it determines the joint probability of an 
infection conditioned on the number of clients served (Allen et al., 2003; Gutierrez et al. 2006; 
Stephenson et al., 2008; Lippman et al., 2010).  
Other studies have shown that issues such as the leve1 of awareness as well as the fear of 
contracting HIV and other STDs are the major factors influencing condom demand, though factors 
such as price, income and brand of condom may play a role (Fernandez 2015; Macaluso et al., 
2000).  
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However, FSW/MSM may choose not to use condoms in their work when cheap or free 
condoms are not available near their work site, despite their awareness of STDs (de la Torre et al., 
2010).  Also, social and environmental factors such as the availability (and quality) of counselling 
and testing services, and the bargaining power of a sexual worker to avoid pressure from a client 
into unprotected sexual intercourse  are elements related to  HIV prevention and health promotion 
(Shannon et al., 2009; Lippman et al., 2010).  In all these cases, the focus has been directed 
towards condom use but not on the economic issue of FSW/MSM as agents that face prices and 
consider condoms as inputs in their work and allocate disposable budget to other expenses.  
However, we leave open the possibility that eventually a FSW/MSM may not be inclined to 
purchase any condom where a prior scenario is set, that is, the decision to purchase or not 
condoms. 
Hence, the objective of this paper is to estimate demand functions for condoms in two 
different population groups, considered as at high risk of HIV infection, namely, FSW and MSM 
in India. The results of this study serve several purposes, first, policy-makers on sexual health will 
have information inputs to design future interventions to control the HIV spread (i.e. through 
giving away condoms for free along with counselling programs) and to analyze the stage of the 
epidemics development (i.e. either it is concentrated on sexual workers and MSM or its spread to 
other population groups). Second, condom manufacturers may use it as market research on the 
population groups who show a relative high demand because of risk profiles.  Finally, the 
theoretical framework developed contribute to the analysis of a good for which it is not possible to 
find a close substitute, particularly when considering the high level of risk when engaging on 
sexual intercourse on a repeated basis. 
2.     Theoretical Framework 
 
The underlying theoretical model relates to condom use/purchase under the uncertainty of 
getting HIV infected because of the very nature of sexual work or active sexual behavior.  The 
optimization problem for the FSW /MSM is as follows 
max 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑥)𝑢(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑙, 𝑥|ℎ) + (1 − 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑥))𝑢(𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑙, 𝑥|𝑛ℎ) 
Subject to 𝑥 + 𝑝𝑞 = 𝑤(24 − 𝑙) + 𝑘?̅? 
𝑙 + 𝑙𝑤 = 24 
Where 𝑞 represents the amount of condoms purchased in a certain period, ?̅? is the amount of 
condoms received for free, 𝑙 is the hours of leisure (or may represent the time devoted to other 
activities different of sexual work), 𝑥 is a composite numeraire good, ℎ is whether the FSW/MSM 
becomes HIV infected and 𝑛ℎ if otherwise, 𝑤 is the average charge for each sexual encounter and 
?̅? is the price the sexual worker may charge for selling the condoms received for free and 𝑙𝑤 is the 
number of hours devoted to sexual work. For simplicity we assume the latter is positively 
correlated to the number of paying clients.  
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The intuition behind is that for sexual workers it would make sense to analyze the consistency 
of condom use over time since it determines the joint probability of an infection, conditioned on 
the number of clients served, that is, 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑞, ?̅?, 𝑥). 
Setting up the Lagrangian and solving the first-order conditions, the Marshallian demand for 
condoms would take the generic form:   
𝑞𝑑 = (
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕𝑙 −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑙 ) +
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑙 (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑙
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 ) +
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) 𝑙𝑤 
+ (
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕?̅? −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕?̅? ) +
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕?̅? (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕?̅?
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 ) +
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) ?̅?
+ (
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕𝑥 −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑥 ) −
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑥 (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑥
𝑓(⋅) (
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 −
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞 ) +
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) 𝑥 
Assume that 
𝜕𝑈(⋅|ℎ)
𝜕𝑙
=
𝜕𝑈(⋅|𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑙
, 
𝜕𝑈(⋅|ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕𝑈(⋅|𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
, 
𝜕𝑈(⋅|ℎ)
𝜕?̅?
=
𝜕𝑈(⋅|𝑛ℎ)
𝜕?̅?
 and 
𝜕𝑈(⋅|ℎ)
𝜕𝑥
=
𝜕𝑈(⋅|𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑥
, 
then (1) simplifies to 
𝑞𝑑 = (
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑙 (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) 𝑙𝑤
+ (
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕?̅? (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) ?̅?
+ (
−
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑥 (𝑈
(⋅ |𝑛ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |ℎ)) +  
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑓(⋅)
𝜕𝑞 (𝑈
(⋅ |ℎ) − 𝑈(∙ |𝑛ℎ)) + 
𝜕𝑈(⋅ |𝑛ℎ)
𝜕𝑞
) 𝑥 
such that: 
𝑞𝑑 = Γ(𝑈(⋅), 𝑙, 𝑞)𝑙𝑤 + Γ(𝑈(⋅), ?̅?, 𝑞)?̅? + Γ(𝑈(⋅), 𝑥, 𝑞)𝑥           (2) 
Assuming that well outcomes are preferred to disease outcomes (Tremblay et al., 2005), the 
difference U(⋅ |nh) − U(∙ |h) is positive, and the signs of the Γ(⋅) terms depend on the influence 
of 𝑙, 𝑞, ?̅? and 𝑥 on 𝑓(⋅).  
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If 
∂U(⋅|nh)
∂l
> 0 and 
∂f(⋅)
∂l
< 0 , then for Γ(U(⋅), l, q) > 0  it is required that 
∂U(⋅|nh)
∂l
>
∂f(⋅)
∂l
(U(⋅ |nh) − U(∙ |h)), that is, the marginal utility from leisure is larger than the marginal 
reduction in joint probability (the more hours devoted to leisure rather than sexual work) and 
whether the sexual worker does not remain indifferent between the infected and non-infected 
states.  Similarly, for Γ(U(⋅), q̅, q) > 0, it is required that  
∂U(⋅|nh)
∂q̅
>
∂f(⋅)
∂q̅
(U(⋅ |nh) − U(∙ |h)), 
that is, the marginal utility from received-for-free condoms  is larger than the marginal reduction 
in joint probability (assuming positive correlation between condoms purchased and received for 
free, and condom use) and whether the sexual worker does not remain indifferent between the 
infected and non-infected states. For Γ(U(⋅), x, q) > 0 , then it is required that  
∂U(⋅|nh)
∂x
>
∂f(⋅)
∂x
(U(⋅ |nh) − U(∙ |h)) where the sign of 
∂f(⋅)
∂x
 is ambiguous but may represent all other goods 
which may expose the FSW/MSM to a larger or lesser risk of infection (i.e., purchase of drugs and 
alcohol, or getting an HIV test made regularly). 
3.     Data 
 
The databases correspond to the follow-up surveys administered by the Frontiers Prevention 
Project (FPP) in India between 2006 and 2007, where the target populations were FSW and MSM. 
The interview questionnaires were developed by an international team of multidisciplinary 
researchers with the participation of key actors. In India, a total of 2,374 FSW and 2,014 MSM 
participated in the study (International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2006). The districts from the Uttar 
Pradesh state where the Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society and FPP intervened were 
Adilabad, Chittoor, Kurnool, Rangareddy, Warangal and Kadapa, and those where only the FPP 
intervened were Anantapur, Karimnagar, Khammam, Medak, Nizamabad and Nalgonda. 
The questionnaires included information on sociodemographic variables (age, education, 
labor status, assets and others), data on sexual behavior (type of sexual partners or clients, sexual 
practices, condom use, charge for sexual work and other details about the three most recent 
clients), information on the regular partner who is defined as the stable non-commercial partner, 
knowledge about HIV/AIDS and STDs, and attitudes toward people who are HIV-infected 
(Gutierrez et al., 2006).  It also included the quantity of condoms purchased, and the total 
expenditure incurred, 7 days before the interview.  
The categorization of FSWs is as follows (International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2006): 
a) Street-based FSWs: if solicit client on streets (cinema, park, bus-stand, railway station, 
hotel / lodge, etc) and provide services at hotel / lodge or a place of client’s choice. 
b) Home-based FSWs: if solicit and provide services to clients at home either directly or 
through a pimp, 
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c) Brothel-based FSWs: if solicit clients through a pimp or gatekeeper and provide services at 
the brothel. 
For MSM the behavioural categories are as follows: 
a) Active:  if self identified to be the insertive partner during sex with males. 
b) Passive:  if self identified to be ther receptive partner during sex with males. 
c) Both 
 
3.1.     Variables 
 
Some of the questions that are sought to be answered in this study, and for which the 
variables of interest and testable hypotheses are defined, are 
1. Whether there exist other individual, household and community level variables, apart 
from condom prices, that determine the decision to purchase condoms and the quantity demanded, 
such as:  
a) Monthly income which serves to represent socioeconomic status (Stephenson and Ong 
Tsui, 2002). It includes all revenues from exercising sexual work, remittances and other 
non-labor income reported. 
b) Marital status 
c) Number of children living in the same household and are supported by the FSW/MSM. 
In this case two implications are worthwhile mentioning: (i) the budget share to be 
allocated to condom purchase may decrease for every child in the household because of 
the requirement to cover the basic needs, or (ii) the budge share for condoms may 
increase since the opportunity cost of an STD.  
d) Number of paying clients and other sexual partners.   
e) Whether had an HIV test in the past 
f) Whether had experienced condom breakage in past sexual intercourse 
g) The use of lubricants which may be considered as a complement good to the condom  
 
2. Since FSW and MSM are considered as at high-risk of HIV infection, in the case of a 
geographically concentrated HIV/AIDS epidemics, health interventions are directed towards 
impeding its spread to other population groups (Jamison et al., 2006), where one of them is giving 
away condoms for free, along with voluntary counselling sessions and HIV testing.  We argue 
these may affect the market demand and the specification to be chosen in this paper. 
3. Along with the above items, we will seek to identify further barriers to condom use 
related to  the social context such as the acceptability of the sexual work and MSM behaviour 
(Koening et al., 1997; Shannon et al., 2009) 
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4.    Econometric Analysis 
 
Initially the use of least squares regressions, to model the quantity of purchase, is appealing 
but in all databases it is reported a high level of zeros. In particular, in the MSM sample there 
appears to be indications that not all of them are sexual workers or, at least, sexual work is not 
their primary occupation, which requires that the analysis and the approach to be different from 
the FSW. Thus, let the binary variable 𝑦𝑖 represent the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ individual's observed response to the 
decision on purchasing condoms, where 𝑦𝑖 = 1 indicates the willingness to purchase at least one, 
and 𝑦𝑖 = 0 otherwise, that is, no purchase at all or which is more interesting, relying only on the 
condoms that are given away for free.  Namely, 
 
𝑦𝑖 = {
1  𝑖𝑓  𝜃𝑍𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 ≥ 0
0  𝑖𝑓  𝜃𝑍𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 < 0
 
 
This is the selection equation for the purchase decision and is determined by a vector of 
exogenous variables 𝑍𝑖, accordingly to a vector of estimates 𝜃, and unobserved features contained 
in 𝜖𝑖. The definition for 𝑦𝑖 allows a positive probability of not purchasing condoms.  Thus, for the 
positive amounts of condoms purchased, 𝑞𝑖, the econometric specification is as follows: 
 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
Where  𝑋𝑖  stands for explanatory variables, and may contain elements of 𝑍𝑖 ,  and  𝑢𝑖 
represents unobserved and uncontrolled effects. In this setting 𝑞𝑖 is observed only when 𝑦𝑖 = 1, 
such that 
𝐸(𝑞𝑖|𝑋, 𝑦 = 1) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝑋, 𝑦 = 1) =  𝑋𝛽 + 𝜌𝜎𝑢𝜆(𝑍𝛾) 
 
Where 𝜌 is the correlation between the unobserved determinants to purchase condoms 𝜖𝑖, 𝜎𝑢 
is the standard deviation of u, and λ is the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at 𝑍𝑖𝜃. The testing of the 
significance of this term in the level equation is equivalent to testing for sample selectivity.  The 
(demand) level equation can then be estimated by replacing 𝜃  with Probit estimates from the 
selection equation, constructing the 𝜆 term, and including it as an additional explanatory variable 
in the linear regression estimation of the level equation. This is the Heckman selection model 
where the main hypothesis relies on the potential sample selection bias in FSW and MSM for their 
actual purchase of condoms (Wooldridge, 2010).   
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5.     Results 
 
5.1.           Description of the Sample 
 
The distribution of MSM and FSW by districts in the State of Andhra Pradesh, India, is 
presented in Table 1. For the MSM, 44% of the sample comes from the non-FPP districts of 
Chittoor and Warangal, whereas 45% from the FPP districts. Data were not collected in the 
districts of Kadapa and Nalgonda. For FSW, 60% of the sample comes from the non-FPP districts. 
Table 1: Distribution of MSM/FSW Interviewed by Districts – Andhra Pradesh State, India 
  MSM FSW 
 District n % n % 
1. Intervened by Andhra Pradesh State AIDS 
Control Society and FPP 
 
Adilabad 137 6.80 368 15.50 
Chittoor 429 21.30 373 15.71 
Kurnool 61 3.03 130 5.48 
Rangareddy 25 1.24 156 6.57 
Warangal 451 22.39 322 13.56 
Kadapa   65 2.74 
Intervened by FPP 
Anantapur 289 14.35 154 6.49 
Karimnagar 329 16.34 459 19.33 
Khammam 31 1.54 20 0.84 
Medak 91 4.52 218 9.18 
Nizamabad 171 8.49 103 4.34 
Nalgonda   6 0.25 
 Total  2014 100 2,374 100.00 
 
Table 2 contains a comparative description of the FSW sample.  FSW in India received, on 
average, 30 condoms for free and serviced 10 clients on the 7 days before the interview, and 
charged 4.69 US dollars per client. FSW spent, on average, 30 minutes with each of the last three 
clients.  However, more relevant than considering FSW only as a risk group, research should 
focus on specific risky practices and their determinants, since these practices, when assumed 
together with condom use, contribute to maintain a low prevalence of STDs. In this sense, 98.1% 
of the sample reported to have used condoms with each of the last three clients and for every of 
the services provided.  In terms of services provided, it was expected that there had been a 
premium charge for every additional service different than vaginal sex (de la Torre et al., 2010), 
thus, the average charge is 4.69 US dollars and there is a small but significant premium charge of 
1.45 dollars for sexual services different than vaginal intercourse. There is a larger variation 
between districts, where FSW in Adilabad, Kadap, Medak and Nizamabad charged, on average, 
3.1 dollars, whereas those in Karimnagar, Khammam, Nalgonda, Rangareddy and Warangal 
charged 4.65, in Antapur 5.46 and those in Chittoor 6.91.   
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From Table 3, 50% of the sample reported being married, and almost 80% reported meeting 
clients in the street or their own homes. Also, 79% of FSW reported belonging either to backward 
or scheduled caste. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for FSW 
 Mean Standard         
Deviation 
Expenditure on condoms (last time when purchased) 0.39** 0.65** 
Amount of  condoms (last time when purchased)) 6.26 21.91 
Amount of condoms received for free 29.92 52.43 
Age 28.66 5.98 
Monthly income 53.94** 47.74** 
Number of  paying clients  (last 7 days) 10.27 6.77 
Average charge to last three clients 4.69** 3.65** 
Average time spent with last three clients (in hours) 0.5 1.511 
Note: * in US dollars, ** original figure in Rupees, converted using average exchange rate of 40 
rupees = 1 US dollar 
Table 3: Socio-Demographic Characteristics for FSW 
 N % 
Marital Status   
Married 1192 50.21 
Single 296 12.47 
Separated (not legally divorced) 363 15.29 
Divorced 193 8.13 
Cohabitation - - 
Widowed 330 13.90 
Total 2374 100 
Type of FSW   
Street based 1071 45.11 
Brothel based 498 20.98 
Home based 801 33.74 
Other - - 
Total 2374 100 
Caste   
Forward caste 319 13.44 
Backward caste 1180 49.75 
Scheduled caste 688 28.98 
Scheduled tribe 185 7.79 
Total 2372 100 
 
Table 4 shows that on average MSM spent 41 cents on condoms, purchased 4.71 and received 
12 for free.   With respect to the number of male partners in the 7 days prior the interview, it is 
6.69, and only 5.45% of the sample reported to perform some type of sexual work either as a 
primary or secondary occupation. 
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From Table 4, 52.23% of the sample reported being single, from those who reported being 
married (899), 148 reported being currently married to another man, whereas the rest to a woman 
but still having some relation with another man. In terms of behavior, 46.18% of the sample self-
assessed as the active partner in the same-sex encounters, and 75% of the sample reported to 
belong either to a backward or scheduled caste. 
Table 4:   Descriptive Statistics for MSM 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
       Expenditure on condoms (last time when purchased) 0.41** 1.54** 
Amount of  condoms (last time when purchased) 4.71 6.11 
Expenditure on lubricant  (last time when purchased) 0.30** 0.52** 
Amount of condoms received for free 12.31 27.11 
Age 26.94 6.61 
Monthly income 23.31** 81.87** 
Number of male partners (last 7 days) 6.69 5.99 
Note: * in US dollars, ** original figure in Rupees, converted using average exchange rate of 
40 rupees = 1 US dollar 
Table 5: Socio-Demographic Characteristics for MSM 
 n % 
Marital Status   
Married 899 44.64 
Single 1,052 52.23 
Separated (not legally divorced) 16 0.79 
Divorced 38 1.89 
Cohabitation - - 
Widowed 9 0.45 
Total 2014 100 
Type of MSM   
Active 930 46.18 
Pasive 701 34.81 
Both 383 19.02 
Other - - 
Total 2014 100 
Caste   
Forward caste 406 20.16 
Backward caste 989 49.11 
Scheduled caste 518 25.72 
Scheduled tribe 101 5.01 
Total 2014 100 
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5.2.           Regression Analysis 
 
For the results in all tables below, the coefficient for the log of price is negative and 
significant at a 95% level, which shows the basic result expected for a demand function.  
5.3.           FSW  
 
Tabla 6(a) contains the results of the level equation for FSW. Price coefficient is negative and 
significant where the calculated elasticity with respect to the quantity purchased is 0.25 in 
absolute value.  Condoms appear to be a normal good since the calculated elasticity of income is 
0.046 but it does not appear to be significant. With respect to marital status, those who are single 
purchase 49% more condoms than a married FSW, but those who are separated (not legally 
divorced) purchase 13.2% less. Besides, for an additional year the FSW remains in the sex 
industry, it leads to an additional increase of 1.8% in the purchase of condoms. As expected, the 
more clients serviced motivates the FSW to purchase more condoms, where for an additional 
client, the FSW will buy up to one more condom. On the same side, it may be argued that the time 
the FSW spends with a client implies that the chances of having repeated intercourse which may 
increases condom use and purchase. However, this effect is not found significant.  
Dummy variables are introduced for each of the districts where the FSW are interviewed, 
where those from the districts of Anantapur, Kurnool, Nizamabad present purchase levels that are 
between 32 and 63% greater than those interviewed in Adilabad.  On the contrary, those from 
Kadapa and Medak purchase 31% less than those in Adilabad. 
There is no difference in condom purchase between street and brothel-based FSW, but those 
that are home-based purchase slightly less. This may originate because they serviced 7.64 clients 
in the 7 days before the interview, whereas the other groups serviced on average 11.85.   But more 
interestingly is to observe, from Table 7 (b), that those FSW that are street or home- based show 
odds for purchasing condoms which are greater in 99 and 97%, respectively, to those who are 
brothel-based.  This effect captures the issue that these two groups received 22 condoms for free, 
whereas those who are brothel-based received 54. 
From the results for the selection equation in Table 6 (b), larger monthly income determines 
positively the chances to purchase condoms, partly reflecting this item as a normal good where the 
calculated odds reflect that from a 1% increase in income, the odds of purchasing condoms 
increase in 15%. 
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Those who reported being divorced, their calculated odds for purchasing condoms are 35% 
higher than those who are married.  Also, significant effects for caste categories were found 
though they disappear once we control for education levels.  Then, those who had some form of 
non-formal education and reached the primary level show odds to purchase condoms which are 
large in 47 and 70%, respectively, compared to those who never attended school.  No significant 
effects are identified for higher levels of education. 
For an additional child that has to be supported by the FSW, the calculated odds for 
purchasing condoms decrease by 7.83%.  Similarly, the odds for purchasing condoms for those 
FSW who participate in a support group are 40% less than those who do not.  This would make 
sense by considering that initially for the former group the average purchase is 5 condoms 
whereas for the latter is 8.59, this difference is significant at a 95% level. Moreover, for every 
condom FSW received for free the calculated odds for purchasing condoms, using her own 
disposable income, decrease in 1.66%. As part of the household variables, family pressure over 
the FSW decisions is observed since for those whose families are aware of the sexual work, the 
odds for purchasing condoms increase by 87% compared to those whose families are not.  
Because of the insignificance of the inverse Mills ratio, there is no selection process in this 
sample and it may be argued that the selection and demand processes are independent. 
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Table 6 (a): FSW Demand Equation 
     
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 Log of price (in rupees) -0.250*** 0.049 
 Log of income (in rupees) 0.046 0.031 
 Age -0.006 0.0054 
 
 
 
District: 
Adilabad as 
reference 
Anantapur  0.628*** 0.122 
Chittoor  0.053 0.081 
Kadapa  -0.372*** 0.132 
Karimnagar  -0.056 0.087 
Kurnool  0.323*** 0.123 
Medak  -0.304*** 0.105 
Nizamabad  0.617*** 0.159 
Rangareddy  0.110 0.133 
Warangal   -0.016 0.125 
 Duration in sex industry (years) 0.018** 0.008 
 Whether family is aware of sexual work 
(Yes: 1, No: 0) 
0.020 0.066 
 
Marital 
status: 
Married as 
reference 
Single 0.491*** 0.155 
Separated (not legally divorced) -0.132* 0.070 
Divorced -0.033 0.084 
Widower 0.004 0.069 
        Number of paying clients (past 7 days) 0.011** 0.005 
        Average time spent with last three clients     -0.017 0.013 
 Number of free condoms received -0.0002 0.001 
 Whether experienced a condom  
breakage (Yes: 1, No: 0) 
0.072 0.047 
 Average charge for last three clients  
(in rupees) 
0.0003 0.0002 
Type of 
sexual 
worker:  
brothel 
based as 
reference 
 
Street based 
 
0.068 
 
0.087 
     
    Home based 
 
-0.015 
 
0.094 
 Intercept 1.374*** 0.359 
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Table 6 (b): Selection Equation - Purchase (No: 0, Yes: 1) 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Log of income (in rupees) 0.077* 0.042 
Caste: Forward caste as 
reference 
Backward caste -0.147 0.110 
Scheduled caste -0.176 0.117 
Scheduled tribe -0.130 0.164 
Type of sexual worker:  
brothel based as reference 
Street based 0.411*** 0.104 
Home based 0.428*** 0.109 
Last level of education 
achieved: Never been to 
school as reference 
Non-formal education 0.285** 0.118 
Primary (class 1 to 5) 0.342*** 0.086 
Upper primary (6 and 7) 0.155 0.108 
High (class 8 to 10) 0.059 0.132 
Marital status: Married as 
reference 
Single -0.048 0.181 
Separated (not legally divorced) -0.062 0.098 
Divorced 0.225* 0.125 
Widower 0.091 0.099 
 
Whether family is aware of sexual 
work (Yes: 1, No: 0) 0.414*** 0.074 
 
Number of children supported -0.063* 0.034 
 
Number of paying clients (past 7 
days) 0.0025 0.006 
 
Duration in sex industry (years) -0.004 0.009 
 
Ever had HIV test (Yes:1, No: 0) 0.178* 0.106 
 
Number of free condoms received -0.003*** 0.001 
 
Average charge for last three 
clients (in rupees) 0.0002 0.0003 
 
Whether participates in a support 
group (Yes:1, No: 0) -0.326*** 0.087 
 
Intercept -0.786** 0.330 
 
Mills: lambda 0.189 0.179 
 
   
 
Observations 1,490   
 
Censored observations 729 
 
 
Uncensored observations 761 
 Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Khamman and Nalgonda districts are dropped for 
colinearity.   
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5.4.            MSM  
 
In Tables 7 (a) and 7 (b) we present the estimations for MSM.  As before, there are 
theoretically consistent results because the coefficients for the own-price and income are both 
negatively and positively significant where the calculated elasticities are -0.42 and 0.06, 
respectively. Moreover, income also plays a role on motivating the decision to purchasing 
condoms (see Table 7 (b)). 
As expected, sexual behavior has a role on determining the number of condoms purchased. 
For an additional sexual male partner, condom demand increases in 1.18%, that is, the average 
purchase increases from 3.25 to 3.83 condoms.  Plus, for an additional 1% expenditure on 
lubricant there is a small but significant increase of 0.3% on the purchase of condoms.  In terms of 
the type of MSM behavior, there is a significant effect only for those who self-assessed as the 
passive partner, where the mean purchase is 18.6% less than those who self-assessed as active. 
The number of condoms received for free induces an increase, though small, in the quantity 
of condoms purchased, where the calculated elasticity is 0.4. This interpretation is plausible 
because 1,148 MSM (almost 70% of the sample) reported receiving condoms from some NGO 
facility or a social worker, where it is customary they receive along some sort of counselling on 
prevention against STDs and promotion of condom use.  In the same sense, those who reported 
had been tested for HIV present odds to purchase condoms that are 22.1% higher than those who 
did not. 
Observing the district dummies, those MSM interviewed in Anantapur, Chittoor and Medak 
reported their purchase of condoms is between 37 and 42% less than those in Adilabad.  No other 
significant effects are identified in the rest of districts. 
From Table 7 (b) it is identified that those who reported being single, their calculated odds to 
purchase condoms are 36% larger than the married.  Also, for every additional child in the 
household, the calculated odds for purchasing condoms increase by 16.3%.  As part of the 
community and support variables, the following effects are identified: (i) for those MSM who 
participate in a support group, their odds to purchase condoms are 38.5% higher than those who 
do not, (ii) for those who reported having problems with their community for their MSM behavior, 
their calculated odds to purchase condoms are 82.2% higher than those who do not, and (iii) for 
those who ever got HIV tested, their calculated odds to purchase condoms are 16.1% higher than 
those who did not. 
In addition, education plays a significant role where the calculated odds for those who 
achieved senior secondary or college degrees are two and three times larger than those that never 
attended school.  
For this sample the absence of a selection effect is not rejected. 
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Table 7 (a): MSM: Demand Equation 
 
  
Coefficient Standard error 
  Log of price (in Rupees) -0.417*** 0.0520 
  Age 0.000112 0.00525 
Marital status: Married as 
reference Single -0.0289 0.0729 
District: Adilabad as 
reference 
Anantapur  -0.371** 0.146 
Chittoor  -0.375** 0.147 
Karimnagar 0.0130 0.125 
Khamman -0.235 0.232 
Kurnool  -0.0537 0.394 
Medak  -0.429** 0.173 
Nizamabad -0.104 0.151 
Rangareddy -0.239 0.328 
Warangal -0.212 0.134 
 
Whether perform some type of sexual 
work (No: 0, Yes: 1) 0.0484 0.0714 
 
Number of sexual male partners (last 
7 days) 0.0115*** 0.00425 
Self assessment on type of 
MSM behavior:  Active as 
reference 
Passive 0.187** 0.0728 
Both 0.0450 0.0799 
 
Log of income 0.0517 0.0477 
 
Whether experienced a condom 
breakage (Yes: 1, No: 0) -0.0407 0.0596 
 
Number of free condoms received 0.00401*** 0.000780 
 
Expenditure on lubricant  0.00298** 0.00137 
 
Intercept 1.422*** 0.412 
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Table 7 (b): Selection Equation: Purchase (No: 0, Yes: 1) 
 
  
Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
  Log of income  0.137** 0.0695 
  Age -0.00512 0.00824 
  
Whether perform some type of 
sexual work (No: 0, Yes: 1) -0.108 0.0969 
Marital status: Married as 
reference Single 0.215* 0.119 
Self assessment on type of 
MSM behavior:  Active as 
reference 
Passive -0.0232 0.109 
Both -0.00916 0.127 
Caste 
Backward caste 0.0305 0.121 
Scheduled caste -0.0676 0.135 
Scheduled tribe -0.244 0.217 
 
Number of children supported 0.104** 0.0484 
 
Number of sexual male partners 
(last 7 days) 0.00594 0.00795 
Last level of education 
achieved: Never been to 
school as reference 
  
  
  
Non-formal education -0.533 0.343 
Primary (class 1 to 5) -0.0684 0.159 
Upper primary (6 and 7) -0.0589 0.157 
High (class 8 to 10) 0.208 0.142 
Senior secondary (11 and 12) 0.585*** 0.190 
College or more 0.668** 0.275 
 
Whether experienced a condom 
breakage (Yes: 1, No: 0) 0.0597 0.0978 
 
Number of free condoms received 7.84e-05 0.00141 
 
Ever had HIV test (Yes:1, No: 0) 0.279*** 0.0948 
 
Whether participates in a support 
group (Yes:1, No: 0) 0.366*** 0.0982 
 
Whether last 3 years had problems 
with community for MSM behavior 
(Yes:1, No: 0) 0.520*** 0.106 
 
Intercept -1.678*** 0.558 
 
Mills -0.0883 0.0991 
 
Observations 905 
 
 
Censored observations 511 
 
 
Uncensored observations 394 
 Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.    Discussion 
 
There are several policy implications from the results.  First, more inclusive policies directed 
towards FSW that work in more risky environments and where free condoms are not distributed. 
Second, interventions should rely more on a perspective inclined to a personal choice framework 
where those should consider as priority the individual rationality and autonomy to determine 
condom use, mainly on social groups and communities have lesser control on influencing sexual 
behavior. Third, FSW and MSM with support from a support network show greater condom 
purchase which directly implies greater condom use, this accords with Blankenship et al. (2008) in 
the sense that at least FSW who have participated in collective action have benefits reflected in 
condom use. 
As for the MSM, condom breakage works against deciding to purchase. As mentioned in 
Bracher et al. (2004) the lower the probability of slippage or breakage, the lower the lifetime risk 
of infection with HIV. One limitation however is that it is not possible to control for the quality of 
condoms purchased or the conditions how they are stored (some MSM reported keeping them in 
the wallet or carrying with them all the time).  Then, once a condoms breaks the MSM may decide 
to purchase some other brand but this does not necessarily imply any behavioural change such that 
no condoms are required in the future.   
According to the social disorganization theory, as communities become more developed and 
as population size and density increase, residents become less constrained by the inhibiting norms 
and informal regulation associated with social groups and community institutions, and become 
more likely to engage in risky behavior, including unprotected sex (FRYE, Victoria et al., 2006). 
For the FSW sample, the estimations show that purchase is conditionally independent of the 
decision to purchase.  The insignificance of the corresponding Inverse Mills ratio contrasts with 
the views of Heckman (1990) who argues that identifying the potential outcome is economically 
more interesting. There might exist a simultaneous relationship between the quantity of condoms 
purchased and the amount of received-for-free condoms. NGOs and government agencies which 
give away the condoms do it so because of the low rate of condom use detected in some of the 
sites where the survey was administered.  But FSW or MSM that receive the condoms, at the same 
time are provided with counselling about protective measures against HIV which, if effective, are 
expected to motivate the purchase of condoms.   
Though in the databases it was available whether the FSW/MSM had received treatment for 
STDs, it could not be considered in the regression analysis because less than 10% of the samples 
reported past STDs.  Also, risk perception of HIV infection was available, however, most of the 
samples grouped either in null or low, and proved to be problematic when included in the 
regression analysis. Another limitation of this study is its cross-sectional nature, which makes that 
causal relationships cannot be drawn. However, the direction of the association between any of the 
explanatory variables and the quantity of condoms purchased may be supported by contextual 
issues. 
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